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Restorative justice (RJ) has been understood 
and conceptualised differently by different 
scholars.1 Courts have also conceptualised 
and invoked this approach varyingly.2 A 
golden thread that runs through these different 
conceptualisations is the understanding that 
RJ makes healing and redress of the harm 
caused by offending, restoration, compensation 
and communication a priority.3 Although RJ is 
devoid of a universally accepted definition, some 
concepts overlap across the literature. Notably, 
it constitutes an approach different from the 
retributive approach to justice, the latter being 
understood as a predominantly accusatory 
South African courts, in at least two reported cases, have dealt with restorative justice (RJ) in 
sentencing offenders (i.e. State v. Thabethe (Thabethe); and State v. Seedat (Seedat). In both cases, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal gave limited regard to RJ, with the presiding judges ‘[cautioning] 
seriously against the use of restorative justice as a sentence for serious offences’. However, in 
countries such as New Zealand, courts have handed down custodial sentences in cases of serious 
offences while giving due regard to RJ at the same time. The purpose of this article is to highlight 
some of the strategies that New Zealand courts have invoked to ensure that a balance is struck 
between retributive justice and RJ. On the basis of this analysis, a conclusion is drawn that RJ can 
play a role in criminal matters by having it reflect through reduced sentences. With such a strategy, 
courts can strike a balance between the clear and powerful need for a denunciating sentence on the 
one hand, and RJ on the other. 
system of justice and the former constituting 
a new approach, which places emphasis on 
healing and redress of the harm caused by 
crime.4 As a number of criminal justice systems 
are predominantly accusatorial, RJ continues 
to reside on the peripheries. Worthy to note, 
however, RJ is not novel to the criminal justice 
systems of South Africa and New Zealand. 
There is an abundance of jurisprudence clearly 
demonstrating the preparedness of the courts in 
these countries to invoke RJ in criminal matters. 
It is pertinent to note, however, that despite the 
fact that RJ has featured in criminal matters in 
both New Zealand and South Africa, it has been 
received and invoked differently.5 South Africa, 
as will be demonstrated in the cases of S v. 
Thabethe (Thabethe)6 and S v. Seedat (Seedat),7 
appears to be taking the extreme position – that 
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN32
RJ has no place and should not constitute 
an option in cases of serious offending. New 
Zealand, on the other hand, appears to be 
taking a middle ground – ensuring that a 
balance is struck between retributive justice 
and RJ. 
Much has been written about RJ and whether 
or not it should have a role in criminal justice. 
Invoking RJ often brings the notion of 
punishment sharply into focus, in particular 
raising questions about whether RJ, if invoked, 
would be compatible with punishment. 
According to Terblanche, the ‘purposes of 
punishment should be dealt with as part of 
the interests of society component of the 
Zinn triad’.8 The components of the Zinn triad 
are prevention, retribution, reformation and 
deterrence. This approach can, however, be 
criticised for not according due regard to the 
rights of victims. RJ, therefore, brings with it 
interesting possibilities with regard to the gaps 
in conventional systems of justice. 
Not surprisingly, literature abounds on the 
need for criminal justice systems to prioritise 
RJ in criminal matters. The entire literature 
cannot be canvassed; however, some of it will 
suffice. Batley advances the viewpoint that RJ 
should have a role and place in all offences, 
including the serious.9 Batley and Skelton 
urge criminal justice practitioners to explore 
pragmatic models with a view to making RJ 
a reality.10 Van der Merwe and Skelton see no 
reason why custodial sentences should not 
co-exist along with RJ, contending that the 
views of victims need to be given due weight 
by ensuring, among others, that RJ is blended 
with a ‘just deserts’ approach.11 Du Toit and 
Nkomo discuss the role that congregations 
can play in advancing RJ.12 Although they do 
not discuss the issue from a criminal justice 
perspective, the points they advance are 
relevant. They argue that, while the seriousness 
of offending needs to be acknowledged, 
equal emphasis needs to be placed on 
‘encouraging a movement towards a unified 
future’.13 The authors place various elements 
of RJ into perspective, including the notion of 
reparation. They take the view that ‘the term 
“reparations” acknowledges that a monetary 
or material compensation cannot make up for 
losses such as a death of a family member or 
the trauma of torture, but suggests it is rather 
a symbolic gesture and an acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing, which is proposed as the 
starting point of reconciliation.’14 In their opinion, 
therefore, reparation is an element not to 
be underestimated in so far as dealing with 
offending is concerned. 
Commentators, however, bemoan the slow 
pace at which courts have warmed up to RJ. 
Skelton, for instance, submits that, although 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa has 
embraced RJ, some flaws remain; for instance, 
courts’ exclusive emphasis on court-ordered 
apologies.15 This tends to undermine the 
broader perspective through which RJ can 
be viewed. Gxubane is critical of criminal 
justice practitioners’ tendency to place some 
cases, especially serious ones, beyond the 
realm of RJ.16 He attributes this practice to the 
misguided view that RJ and punishment are 
diametrically opposed, and as such cannot 
co-exist. This assumption is puzzling in light 
of certain commentators’ argument that some 
punishment is necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of RJ.17 Louw and Van Wyk have 
concluded that ‘in general legal practitioners find 
restorative justice to be suitable in the South 
African context’.18 They are equally concerned 
that ‘undue emphasis is placed on retribution 
and on the extensive use of imprisonment in the 
current justice system, despite the availability of 
restorative options’.19 A cross-cutting concern 
in the literature, therefore, is the limited regard 
accorded to RJ. It remains unclear, however, 
how this concern can be addressed in a system 
inclined towards retribution. 
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This article explores some viable strategies for 
incorporation of RJ in a criminal justice system 
such as South Africa’s, which is potentially 
retributive. This is achieved by drawing insight 
from the approach of the courts in New 
Zealand. Following this introduction, the article 
briefly discusses the position of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa on RJ in cases 
of serious offending, using Thabethe and Seedat 
as examples. It then critically analyses selected 
court decisions in New Zealand, demonstrating 
how courts dealt with RJ in cases of serious 
offending and ensured that RJ complemented 
denunciating sentences for serious offending. 
The strategies adopted by New Zealand courts 
are highlighted. Since New Zealand’s courts, like 
South Africa’s, are predominantly accusatory, 
the article explores what South Africa’s justice 
system can learn from New Zealand’s with 
regard to RJ. 
Restorative justice in South Africa: 
the Thabethe and Seedat cases
The Thabethe case that came before the High 
Court concerned an accused (Thabethe) who 
was found guilty of the rape of the complainant, 
his 15-year-old stepdaughter.20 The rape 
occurred at a time when the accused and the 
complainant’s mother were living together as 
companions. During this companionship, the 
accused covered the living expenses of all 
family members, including the complainant.21 
The accused pleaded guilty to raping the 
complainant and was accordingly convicted. 
During the proceedings, the complainant 
testified that although she was hurt by the 
accused, she wished that he would not be 
sentenced to a custodial sentence since her 
entire family was financially dependent on him.22 
As the true wishes of the complainant could 
not be established during trial proceedings, 
the court considered a victim/offender 
programme.23 Neither the prosecution nor the 
defence objected to the programme.24 
The programme involved the victim, the 
offender, a probation officer and the Restorative 
Justice Centre of Pretoria.25 It was successfully 
concluded, during which the complainant 
reiterated her wish that the convict not be given 
a custodial sentence.26 The court found the 
case fit for application of RJ and, on this basis, 
handed down a 10-year term of imprisonment, 
suspended for five years.27 With the sentence 
suspended, it meant that after five years the 
convict would no longer be at risk 
of imprisonment. 
The High Court’s approach is to be welcomed 
in how it embraced RJ. This approach affirms 
calls by scholars to accord due regard to RJ in 
criminal matters. However, it is also to be faulted 
for giving limited regard to the denunciating 
role of custodial sentences in cases of serious 
offending. Giving due regard to RJ does not 
necessarily suggest that custodial sentences 
should be disregarded. Rather, a proper balance 
needs to be struck between punishment and 
RJ. By not considering custodial sentences 
at all, the High Court failed to strike a proper 
balance between RJ and the denunciating role 
that custodial sentences play.  
The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed 
the above decision in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, which ruled that RJ constitutes a 
viable sentencing option in criminal matters.28 
However, it was sceptical of RJ’s role in cases 
of serious offending. It noted emphatically that 
in serious crimes, RJ is unsuitable because it 
fails to ‘reflect the seriousness of the offence 
and the natural indignation and outrage of the 
public’.29 In the court’s view, the circumstances 
of the case, even though compelling, did not 
justify a sentence based on RJ.30 The court 
went on to firmly ‘caution seriously against 
the use of restorative justice as a sentence for 
serious offences which evoke profound feelings 
of outrage and revulsion amongst law-abiding 
and right-thinking members of society’.31 The 
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Supreme Court of Appeal is to be commended 
for according due regard to the seriousness of 
child rape by considering a custodial sentence. 
However, in downplaying the role of RJ, it ended 
up forfeiting RJ for the goals of deterrence and 
denunciation (by way of custodial sentences). 
Accordingly, this court also failed in its task of 
striking a balance between RJ and retributive 
justice, seemingly suggesting that RJ cannot 
co-exist alongside retributive justice in cases of 
serious offending. 
The case of Seedat also pertained to the 
sexual offence of rape.32 The accused (Seedat), 
who was 60 years at the time the crime was 
allegedly committed, was charged before the 
Regional Court with the crime of rape of the 
complainant (a 57-year-old woman).33 The court 
found Seedat guilty and accordingly convicted 
him. Before arriving at the sentence, both the 
prosecution and the defence led evidence. 
The prosecution led the evidence of a clinical 
psychologist who relayed the complainant’s 
wishes that the court should not impose a 
community-based sentence but instead that an 
order for financial compensation be made on 
account of the trauma she suffered owing to the 
rape.34 The state was against the complainant’s 
request, preferring a lengthy term of 
imprisonment on account of the seriousness of 
rape.35 The trial court, having taken into account 
the submissions of both the defence and the 
prosecution, sentenced Seedat to seven 
years’ imprisonment.36 
It can be deduced from the trial court’s decision 
that, although the complainant desired that 
the sentencing process accord regard to 
compensation, this was not an option for 
the state. It is also evident that the possibility 
of balancing compensation and a custodial 
sentence was not explored by the trial court. 
Seedat appealed the trial court’s decision in the 
High Court. The High Court had to address a 
number of issues, including the validity of the 
sentence handed down. Although it dismissed 
Seedat’s appeal, it set aside the sentence 
imposed by the High Court by suspending it 
in its entirety for five years subject to some 
conditions, including a requirement that 
the convict pay the complainant a total of 
R100 000.37 Notably, Seedat did not plead 
guilty, but he was nonetheless prepared to pay 
the said compensation.38 From the foregoing 
decision, the High Court is to be commended 
for giving regard to one of the elements of RJ – 
the voice of the victim. However, by suspending 
the sentence in its entirety, the High Court failed 
to strike a balance between the victim’s voice 
and the seriousness of rape. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed 
the sentence handed down by the High Court 
in the Supreme Court of Appeal, contending 
that it was incompetent and invalid because 
no custodial sentence was imposed.39 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal took the view that RJ 
was not an appropriate sentencing option for a 
matter as serious as rape.40 The court therefore 
reversed the High Court sentence, drawing 
on its own earlier decision in Thabethe.41 It 
consequently substituted the suspended 
sentence with four years’ imprisonment.42 
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal, by 
considering a custodial sentence, was alive to 
the seriousness of rape, it ended up dismissing 
the role of RJ altogether on account of rape 
being a serious crime. By not exploring the 
possibility of striking a balance between RJ 
and custodial sentences, the court excluded 
the goals of RJ from the sentencing agenda. 
In the court’s view, ‘a sentence entailing a 
businessman being ordered to pay his rape 
victim in lieu of a custodial sentence is bound 
to cause indignation with at least a large portion 
of society’.43 The issue of concern in Seedat is 
not so much the four-year sentence ultimately 
handed down, but rather the total disregard of 
the victim’s requested compensation and, more 
generally, the possibility of harmony between 
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custodial sentences and compensation. 
Arguably, compensation did not have to be 
pitted against a custodial sentence. 
New Zealand: striking a balance  
The cases discussed thus far illustrate how 
courts tend to struggle to balance the retributive 
theory of justice and RJ at the sentencing 
stage. In both Thabethe and Seedat, because 
the Supreme Court of Appeal needed to affirm 
the gravity of the crimes (sexual offences), a 
sentence that excluded custodial sentence 
would not be an option. Some form of 
custodial sentence was indeed warranted, 
but in imposing such a custodial sentence, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal disregarded the 
outcome of the RJ process. A question worth 
asking is: did both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal have to choose one 
approach over the other, or can a balance be 
struck to incorporate both? In the next section, 
New Zealand’s case law is reviewed to help 
answer this question. This review is intentionally 
limited to three cases in which a balance was 
struck between punishment and RJ. 
The Clotworthy case
The case of R v. Clotworthy (Clotworthy) is 
celebrated in New Zealand as establishing a 
persuasive precedent for RJ’s relevance to 
serious offending.44 In Clotworthy, the offender, 
having spent the day drinking alcohol, stabbed 
another man (the victim) in an act described as 
one of aggression.45 It was established that the 
stabbing was random and without explanation. 
The offender was charged with the offence of 
wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm, an offence punishable by up to 14 years’ 
imprisonment.46 Based on previous decisions of 
a similar nature, an appropriate sentence for the 
crime would have ranged from three and a half 
to six years in prison.47 
The Auckland District Court welcomed an RJ 
meeting, where both the victim and offender 
saw no point in a custodial sentence. Instead, 
they agreed that the offender pay the victim’s 
substantial medical bills. The Auckland District 
Court was presented with this agreement and 
asked to hand down sentence. It sentenced 
Clotworthy to two years’ imprisonment 
(suspended), and ordered him to pay $15 000 to 
the victim and perform 200 hours of community 
service.48 The state appealed this sentence. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal ordered 
a custodial sentence of three years and 
ordered the convict to pay $5 000 reparation 
to the victim.49 It based this on the historical 
precedent of sentences for such crimes, and the 
offender’s willingness to plead guilty and to pay 
compensation.50 In handing down this sentence, 
the judge ruled that RJ must be ‘balanced 
against other sentencing policies’.51 The judge 
added that ‘the restorative aspects can have, 
as here, a significant impact on the length of the 
term of imprisonment which the court is directed 
to impose’.52
A number of points in Clotworthy are 
worth highlighting: 
• Although the offence was serious, allowing 
a custodial sentence of up to 14 years’ 
imprisonment, RJ was not discounted.  
• The outcomes of the RJ meeting were 
not conclusive. The court still exercised 
its discretion to determine the appropriate 
sentence, with a view to ensuring a balance 
between RJ and other sentencing goals, such 
as deterrence.
• The outcomes of the RJ meeting were 
considered together with other sentencing 
policies. 
• The outcome demonstrated that RJ can justify 
reduced sentences.
• The case confirms that RJ and retributive 
justice can be complementary.
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With Clotworthy in mind, are the rulings in 
Thabethe and Seedat, to the effect that RJ 
has no place in cases of serious offending, 
defensible? Perhaps the court should have 
allowed RJ to inform the length of the sentence 
handed down. Instead, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal dismissed the notion of RJ as 
irrelevant where custodial sentences are 
unavoidable. This view subordinates RJ, and 
unnecessarily so. 
Significantly, the Clotworthy decision has also 
been criticised for considering RJ too narrowly. 
Some contend that its focus on reparation 
obscures the wider goals and objectives of 
RJ.53 In truth, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, 
in blending RJ (in the form of reparation) with 
a custodial sentence, limited RJ’s potential 
contribution. However, it is arguably better for 
RJ to be applied piecemeal rather than being 
downplayed, as happened in Seedat 
and Thabethe. 
The Police case
The 2001 decision in Police v. Stretch (Police) 
pertained to an offender who was convicted 
of multiple driving offences and manslaughter 
in New Zealand.54 Although the case involved 
no formal RJ referral, the families of the 
offender and deceased met with the intention 
of resolving the dispute in a restorative 
manner. As with Clotworthy, striking a balance 
between RJ and traditional sentencing was not 
straightforward. Confronted with both families’ 
wishes, the High Court sentenced the offender 
to 18 months in prison.55 It is worthy to note 
that the historical precedent of sentences for 
manslaughter was three and a half years.56
Dissatisfied with what it saw as a lenient 
sentence, the crown appealed in the Court of 
Appeal, which increased the sentence to two 
and a half years. The court recognised the 
value of RJ, but in light of the Clotworthy case, 
believed the 18-month sentence too lenient 
for manslaughter.57 The court also gave due 
regard to the victim’s family, noting that ‘[i]n this 
context, the most compelling part of the material 
available to the sentencing Judge, was the clear 
statement of the dead girl’s father that for him, 
and his family, a lenient sentence would most 
assist them in the healing process’.58 The court 
added that:
It appears the principles of restorative 
justice may stand in conflict with 
principles of deterrence which represent 
the norm, but if the recognition of 
restorative justice in Clotworthy is to have 
practical effect, then I think a balance 
must be sought, no matter how difficult it 
might be to find that balance.59
Again, a number of points are worth highlighting:
• Invoking RJ does not require a light 
 prison sentence.
• RJ can be invoked alongside a custodial 
sentence. In this case, RJ resulted in a shorter 
custodial sentence than that apparent in 
previous case law.
• The appellate court can increase the length of 
a custodial sentence to ensure that a proper 
balance is struck between RJ and other 
sentencing policies. 
The Police case is of relevance to the South 
African Thabethe. Notably, when the RJ 
sentence handed down by the court was 
appealed in the Supreme Court of Appeal, the 
presiding judge in the latter court stated:
I have no doubt about the advantages of 
restorative justice as a viable alternative 
sentencing option provided it is applied 
in appropriate cases. Without attempting 
to lay down a general rule I feel obliged 
to caution seriously against the use of 
restorative justice as a sentence for 
serious offences which evoke profound 
feelings of outrage and revulsion amongst 
law abiding and right-thinking members 
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of society. An ill-considered application of 
restorative justice to an inappropriate case 
is likely to debase it and make it lose its 
credibility as a viable sentencing option.60
Pertinent to note, this same position was 
endorsed by the same court in Seedat, in which 
RJ was downplayed, having no role whatsoever 
in informing the length of the sentence handed 
down. The court in Police acknowledged that 
restorative elements are not enough to justify a 
light sentence (18 months for causing death), 
but did not rule out the role of RJ in informing 
the final sentence handed down. In contrast, in 
South Africa’s Thabethe and Seedat the initial 
sentences were set aside without regard to RJ. 
The Cassidy case
The 2003 decision in the case of R v. 
Cassidy (Cassidy) pertained to the offence 
of manslaughter in New Zealand.61 The facts 
leading to this decision were as follows: there 
was a scuffle at a bar between the victim 
and the bar manager, in which the victim (a 
customer at the bar) assaulted the bar manager. 
The offender, who was employed at the bar, 
intervened with a view to defending the bar 
manager. In the course of intervention, the 
offender, using his hand, struck the victim (i.e. 
the customer at the bar). The victim lost his 
balance, fell backwards and struck his head, 
resulting in his death.62 The matter came before 
the High Court of New Plymouth, in which a 
formal RJ meeting was convened between 
representatives of the offender and the victim.63 
At the RJ meeting, the offender accepted full 
responsibility for the offence. He also expressed 
sorrow and deep remorse for having caused the 
victim’s death, and apologised unequivocally 
to the victim’s family. Following the meeting, 
the court was tasked with determining an 
appropriate sentence. Notably, the presiding 
judge told the offender:
I intend to give you credit for attending 
the restorative justice process. I know you 
have said it is the hardest thing you have 
done and I can understand that. You did 
not need to do it, and you will be given 
credit for that. I accept there has been 
genuine remorse and a genuine attempt 
by you to assist the victim’s family.64
Ultimately, having considered and balanced all 
the factors, the offender was sentenced to 
two years’ imprisonment. The following is 
worth noting:
• Manslaughter, however serious an offence it 
is, did not bar the court from according due 
regard to RJ. 
• The outcome of the RJ meeting informed the 
sentence handed down. 
In sum, in Cassidy, as with Clotworthy and 
Police, RJ was ultimately blended with 
retributive justice. 
Discussion and conclusion
A position has been taken by South Africa’s 
Supreme Court of Appeal, as apparent in 
Thabethe and Seedat, that RJ should not be 
used in cases of serious offending. This position 
seems to be based on the premise that RJ 
processes cannot rest comfortably alongside 
a sentencing process where the outcome is a 
custodial sentence or punishment. Despite the 
foregoing position, scholars, including those 
in South Africa, have long called for RJ to be 
accorded due regard in criminal matters. The 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
both Thabethe and Seedat appear to confirm 
Louw and Van Wyk’s concern that emphasis 
is often placed on custodial sentences, to the 
detriment of RJ. The courts’ trend also seems 
to affirm Gxubane’s anxiety about criminal 
justice practitioners’ tendency to place serious 
cases out of reach for RJ. Indeed, the proactive 
step taken by the High Court to invoke 
elements of RJ in both Seedat and Thabethe 
is commendable. However, the High Court’s 
approach confirms Skelton’s concern that in 
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invoking RJ, courts sometimes place exclusive 
emphasis on notions of RJ such as ‘apologies’, 
to the detriment of the seriousness of crime. 
From Thabethe and Seedat, it may be 
concluded that the courts are not striking a 
balance between RJ and punishment. Thus, an 
outstanding challenge remains: how can RJ be 
blended into a system that potentially advances 
the notion of just deserts? This article has 
attempted to address this question by drawing 
on selected decisions from New Zealand courts 
to show that if a proper balancing exercise is 
invoked, elements of RJ can co-exist alongside 
a sentencing approach that results in custodial 
sentences. This can be effectively accomplished 
by having RJ elements inform the length of 
the custodial sentence handed down. The 
foregoing position remains defensible in light of 
the fact that the literature affirms that RJ does 
not necessarily have to exclude punishment. 
Thus, the adoption of such an approach has the 
potential for allowing the implementation of calls 
long made by commentators concerning RJ. 
Of course, New Zealand’s approach is not 
perfect, nor should it be transplanted to South 
Africa. Rather, consideration of New Zealand’s 
case history may help to throw up imaginative 
solutions for sentencing judges in South Africa 
who are confronted with similar tensions. 
Because of the reporting system of New 
Zealand case law, some judgements could not 
be accessed in full. Thus, in some cases, the 
author had to make recourse to case notes. 
This ultimately impacted negatively on the 
validity of the conclusions drawn and, more 
importantly, deprived the discussion of a more 
rigorous engagement with these judgements. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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